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Abstract 
 
Like many companies, Honeywell estimates the probability of control system problems and safeguard 
layer faults using the available reliability data. Probably like others, we have wondered how accurate 
these “standard numbers” are in our services. In our Advanced Materials division, we have been 
collecting real-world data on initiating events, Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) and other 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) in the data historians at two of our new low-global-warming 
Hydro Fluoro Olefin (HFO) units. Recently, we began using analysis tools to “mine” this data to see 
what it could tell us about our actual Initiating Event Frequencies and the Risk Reduction Factors being 
achieved. In essence, we are comparing the actual performance of our critical safety Layers of 
Protection with the performance that was intended by the PHA team.  
In this paper we will describe the results of the Operation and Maintenance phase of the Safety Life 
Cycle and how we are using the resulting data in several important ways: to indicate the real-time health 
of active IPLs - watching for events like IPL degrading, and bypassing; to integrate the learnings as Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) to leadership and as inputs to our PHA/LOPA revalidations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 20+ years, improved understanding of process safety risk and decreasing risk tolerance has 
led to many more safety interlocks, particularly Safety Integrity Level (SIL) rated interlocks, being 
installed in process industry facilities. These have substantially reduced the probability and thus the risk 
of catastrophic incidents – generally by one or two orders of magnitude, possibly more. On the other 
hand, they have increased the number of trip activations – both real and spurious. And without a doubt 
they have increased the effort required to test and maintain these safeguards.  
   
 
Standards like IEC 61511 / ISA 84.00.01(ref 1) and Recommended Practices like API RP 754 (ref 2) 
call for methods to identify and inform appropriate personnel at various levels in an organization on 
“Key Performance Indicators” (KPI) which could be either a leading indicator (before any incident or 
action occurs) or lagging indicator (after the incident or action). IEC61511 calls for Functional Safety 
Assessment of an installed Safety Instrumented System (SIS) after a few years of operation to make a 
judgement call based on such KPIs if the SIS is doing what it was supposed to.  
Such KPI’s are a useful measure to (ref 3): 
 
1. Prevent major incidents –KPIs released by an individual site to the company headquarters and 
later nationwide, the company (and other companies in the similar business) can analyze and 
learn what led to the Process Safety Incident, the root cause and how this can be avoided in the 
future.  
2. Improve Reliability – Steps taken by a company to reduce major Process Safety Incidents help 
improve Reliability of Process Operations.5 
3. Avoid Complacency – KPI’s provide a measure of asset integrity. Just because there has been 
no major incident for a long time does not mean everything is fine. Leading KPI’s could provide 
valuable information on the health of assets and indicate that it is time for maintenance on the 
asset.    
4. Communicate Performance –KPI’s could provide to the company and State / Country how the 
individual site is performing while or could asses performance internal to the  individual site  
 
Identifying key leading and lagging indicators at various levels in an organization and monitoring them 
on a continuous basis could give an indication of Process Safety performance at a site. These indicators, 
expressed as KPIs, are different at various levels in an organization. As an example, a major gas leak 
above the tolerable limits set by the local jurisdiction would be a lagging indicator and would be a KPI 
at the Corporate level while a demand on an SIS would be a leading indicator KPI for the Plant Manager 
and Shift Engineer indicating they should take a closer look at the process as to why a SIS Loop had to 







KPIs at various levels in an organization will be different.  
 
Figure 1 (ref 3) 
KPIs at these levels are usually more 
detailed and tend to be more of 
leading and less of lagging indicators 
KPIs at these levels are usually 
summarized and tend to be more of 
lagging and less of leading indicators  
   
 
COMPANY LEADERSHIP CONCERNS 
Is enough being done? 
It’s natural to focus our attention on identifying and tracking the individual risk scenarios that have the 
potential to lead to catastrophic outcomes. We need to find these, then identify solutions, budget for 
them and eventually design and install them. While our leaders will initially be looking at achieving the 
risk targets, they’ll eventually ask whether these solutions are giving the intended level of safety – 
especially if an incident occurs. Have you gone digging in a PHA report to see what it said after 
something went wrong? We certainly have. 
     
      Figure 1 (ref 1) - The Layer of Protection Model, showing all layers 
Are we doing the right things? Could we be doing too much?  
For process safety staff, this is a tricky discussion. We have a tendency to think that there’s no such 
thing as too much safety. But there are always multiple demands for capital and it’s prudent to take a 
broader view. Certainly our leaders do. They recognize that reducing the risk of 10 scenarios by 1 order 
of magnitude (a factor of 10) is more effective1 assuming ALL other factors are the same, than reducing 
5 of them by 2 orders of magnitude (a factor of 100) and leaving the other 5 for later. Ignoring units for 
a moment, mathematically it looks like this: 
Scenario 1, Mitigated Risk = 10 * 0.1 = 1 
Scenario 2, Mitigated Risk = 5 *0.01 + 5 = 5.05 
It’s also why savvy leaders are looking for some proof that the investments they are making in process 




                                                 
1 There are enough caveats to this statement to fill another paper.   
Figure 3 - Focus of this Paper 
   
 
Moving from Rules-based Criteria to Data-based  
Rules are important. They help the PHA teams obtain consistent results, and prevent most arguments. 
And we advocate for following the PHA rules in the vast majority of cases. But most operating 
companies allow their expert risk analysts to select partial credits for very well-understood and well 
controlled situations. If we are looking for optimal solutions, we need more accurate, “specific-to-our-
application” data. In the past, we’ve looked solely to the Reliability Engineers to give us this, based on 
their testing data. It’s still a good idea to include Reliability, but we can now provide ourselves with 
another source of raw data.  
 
Is this system getting better than average Reliability? Or Worse? 
Available industry standard failure rate data, such as CCPS’s Process Equipment Reliability Database, 
has a wide range of values. In some cases more than 2 orders of magnitude from the lower values to the 
upper values. This makes sense given the wide variation in “quality” of something like a ball valve. 
Good ones tend to last longer. And, of course, services vary widely. High quality ball valves last even 
longer if they aren’t in acidic mud (“severe”) service. And the converse is true.  
Most Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) teams struggle with these issues. If they choose to degrade 
the reliability from one of the “standard” values, they’ll do it by a factor of 10. That may make sense, or 
it may be conservative. Or the actual performance may be even worse. You may have inspection results, 
or repair history, but it’s time-consuming for maintenance to report this in great detail in their 
Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS), and it rarely gets down to the tag number of 
the particular instrument or valve involved. Even in the old days when paper records were kept, it was 
possible – though difficult – to extract reliability/availability information. 
As a practical matter, you are depending on the opinion of the maintenance representative. Generally 
these folks remember the really bad actors IF they’re close enough to the day-to-day work to know when 
a particular transmitter or valve required frequent repair because it failed in a “revealed” way. Only in 
rare cases do we get input about whether a particular valve had repeatedly failed in proof-testing even 
though it happens more frequently. So generally we are not getting up-to-date information in our Process 
Hazard Analysis (PHA) even though the information lies in our plant site’s data systems. 
 
EXAMPLES FROM A HONEYWELL PROCESS PLANT 
 
The Problem 
Honeywell’s Performance Materials and Technologies (PMT) operating plants have been working on all 
the above issues, too. We’ve made it a requirement that our sites investigate each activation of a “PHA-
Credited” Safeguard as a Near Miss. And IEC 61511 now asks the Functional Safety Engineers at the 
site to confirm the interlock worked properly as part of that investigation. Most of our SIS loops work 
reliably on demand once we install them. The demands on these SIS loops are also not frequent – 
especially as most are designed for “low demand mode”. But in a business like ours, we want assurance 
both that the IEF is as low as we predicted and that the safeguards / protection layers are working at least 




Pressure control loop on a distillation tower 
This example considers a group of typical distillation columns. They have a Reboiler to provide heat and 
to boil up the liquid in the bottom. This is the most significant potential source of overpressure. Each 
column’s vapor pressure is controlled by a simple overhead pressure control loop. A fault in that loop 
   
 
could cause the column pressure to rise. Each column has a pressure safety relief valve (PSV) set to 
protect it by venting the contents of the column to a scrubber in case the control and alarm safety 
systems fail to prevent such an overpressure. In the past this might have been sufficient, but this system 
alone does not achieve Honeywell’s current target risk level, so a High-High Pressure interlock2 was 
added to shut off the reboiler heat source. This design met the risk target as designed. 
Like a number of other companies, several years ago Honeywell adopted the leading practice of adding 
a Control Plan to its operating procedures. There is no “official” title for these. Some other companies 
use the term “Safe Operating Limits Table (SOLT)” and at least one company refers to this as an 












































Ensure column is venting to 
LPS. Isolate column from 
any higher sources of 
pressure. Stop reboiler 
steam flow manually and 
increase condenser water 


















102 to stop 
heat to the 
Reboiler 
Approaching 
pressure that will 
require relief 
through RVs. 
Ensure XV-201 has opened 
and HIC-401 is allowing 
pressure to vent. Confirm 
XZV-102 has closed. 













FIC-102 in a 
cascade loop 
  
High Alarm 240  
BPCS 
  
May reduce flow 
from reactor or 
cause upset. 
Check pressure in 
downstream column. 
Check reboiler and 






Set pressure based on what 
gives good column 
performance and recovery 
of recycle material. 
Low 200  
Can stop feeding 
forward to next 
column. 
Ensure column is not 
venting to LPS. Check 
reboiler and condenser are 
normal. 
Low Low -- Quality   
Never to 
Exceed 
--  None   
Table 1 : Example of Safe Operating Limits Table (SOLT) 
                                                 
2 Where practical, Honeywell uses the Inherently Safer approach of selecting the MAWP of distillation columns such that 
the maximum potential pressure from the heat source would not challenge the vessel integrity.  
   
 
The principle behind the table is to show important process parameters with the instrument loop which 
controls that parameter, as well as its normal set point and (often) some range in which the operator 
might vary the set-point or operate the system in manual - say, during startup or shutdown.  
 
 
Figure 4. Typical Distillation Column with Safeguards 
 
These fit well with Layers of Protection Analyses (LOPA) and provide direct mapping for the analyst 
checking the system performance.  
Any Interlock activation (eg. PZIT102) needs to be “Validated” per IEC61511 (2015, Clause 5.2.5.3), 
and should be reported as a “Near Miss” per API754. It’s also a “Demand” of the Safety interlock also 
referred to as Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF), so it should be counted to compare these with the 
target frequency assumed in the PHA/LOPA.  
So how well is it working in practice? Is the plant operating “in the Green”? This and nine other similar 
columns were checked. Only one fault was found anywhere in the control loops in more than three and a 
half years of operation. There’s a good chance that fault was due to an installation problem as it 
happened very shortly after start-up. Nevertheless that failure was counted as part of “all causes”. Thus 
the unit experienced 1 fault with 10 x 3.5 years of experience, so the failure rate was 1/35 or 0.029 
faults/year. This is about 10x better than the standard LOPA assumed rate for similar cases. This is not a 
statistically large enough sample to consider changing the LOPA guidance for Initiating Event 
Frequency (IEF), but it is reassuring that the LOPA team assumption has not been found to be 
aggressive. 




Figure 5. IPLs in a LOPA to reduce Risk  
 
The Reliability and Availability of the SIFs were also checked. Based on the LOPA, the SIFs were 
designed to be SIL2 which would be a Reliability of 99% (refer Table 3 and Figure 5) in our scenario. 
To understand how Reliable they really are, the test records and the historian data were checked. The 
test records have shown all subsystems of the loops were functional at the end of each test interval. Thus 
it can be inferred that the interlocks were functional all the time they were in service since installation 
and would have operated Reliably on demand. This conforms to “more than 99%” reliability for which 
the SIFs had initially been designed.  
 




Risk Reduction Factor 
(RRF) 
Probability of Failure on 
Demand (PFD) 
Reliability 
(1 - PFD) 
1 10 to 100 0.1 to 0.01 .9 to .99 
2 100 to 1,000 0.01 to 0.001 .99 to .999 
3 1,000 to10,000 0.001 to 0.0001 .999 to .9999 
4 >10,000 0.0001 to 0.00001 .9999 to .99999 
Table 3. SIL in relation with other parameters 
The Historian information was then checked for the amount of time the SIFs were in “Bypass mode”. 
This was about 24 hours over the same period, so >99.9% of the period, the SIFs were Available to 
operate on demand. Figure 6 below shows Availability over a period of 60 minutes as snapshot.  
At about 9:35 am, the Operator put the SIF input (100PZI4001) on “bypass” and at that instant onwards 
the input parameter shows “zero”. All actions and events on the SIS are attributed with a “Risk index” 
number which is configurable based on user input. In this case, putting the Input value on Bypass is 
associated with a Risk index of “One” which means the process is running on a High risk because the 
SIF input is not being measured.  
   
 
 
Figure 6. Safety interlock Availability over a 60 minute snapshot showing a change 
 
Thus the analysis has validated that the LOPA target is being met for this scenario both in terms of 
Reliability and Availability  
  
   
 
Other parameters that could affect Reliability or Availability of Independent Protection Layers (IPL) can 
also be monitored. Examples:  
 
1. Safety Interlock in degrade mode due to failure of Input Transmitter signal (0 mADC) to the 
Logic Solver which could affect Reliability (See Figure 7). At about 9:35 am, the transmitter 
(100PZI4002) signal drops to 0 mADC and from there on the process value reads zero. The Risk 






Figure 7.  Safety interlock transition to Degrade mode due to transmitter failure over a 60 minute 
snapshot 
  
   
 
2. Safety Interlock in degrade mode due to “frozen” Input Transmitter signal to the Logic Solver 
which could affect Reliability. The example below indicates two transmitters in a redundant 
configuration and one of the transmitters (100AZI4001A) is essentially “frozen” for the most 
part reading a process value of 200. The Risk index is configured to “0.5”, because there is a 
redundant transmitter available as part of the SIF input 
 
 
Figure 8.  Safety interlock transition to Degrade mode due to transmitter signal “frozen” over a 60 
minute snapshot 
 
3. BPCS control loop in Degrade mode due to it being in “Manual” instead of “Auto” for a long 
time which could affect Reliability. In Figure 9, 100PIC4003 mode is changed to Manual at 
9:41am. The controller output is manually changed to 100% and the process value starts 
increasing and saturates at 350 engineering units. The Risk index is configured to be “One” in 









Figure 9.  BPCS Control loop from “Auto” to “Manual” mode over a 60 minute snapshot 
 
  




Redundant Analyzers as inputs to SIF 
If a heat exchanger in process service experiences a tube leak, it may put a hazardous material into the 
heat transfer fluid. It may be possible to detect the leak using analyzers such as for pH, Conductivity, 
depending on the properties of the process and heat transfer fluids. This is a useful capability, though 
analyzers tend to be relatively complicated systems with a number of potential fault modes and thus are 
generally considered to have relatively lower reliability/availability.  
 
 
Here’s an example of a “problem” set of Analyzers. The team estimated the IEF based on the LOPA 
table. They determined a safeguard should also be applied, so they added dual analyzers in a 1oo2 
configuration. As it turned out, the tubes were more reliable  than estimated and substantially more 
reliable than the analyzers that were meant to find any leaks. In one 5 week period, six of the analyzers 
had activated a total of 30 times, an average of once per week (Table 1). In fact, there had not been any 
leaks – as demonstrated by test and/or inspections after each activation. Thus all analyzer-triggered trips 
have been spurious. This High Spurious Trip Rate meant the Technology and PHA teams had to come 
back to the issue and find suitable alternates. There were two problems to be solved: the analyzers 
weren’t reliable enough in this particular application to be part of a SIF and the spurious trip rate was 
causing significant business interruption.  
 

















Table 4 - Demands for Analyzers in 1oo2 input configuration 
   
 
 
Figure 10.  Spurious trip in a 1oo2 input configuration over a 60 minute snapshot 
 
In Figure 10, at about 9:40 am, Analyzer 100AZI4002A spuriously senses the value as 323 engineering 
units when it is actually between 21 and 35 engineering units. Because of this reason, being in a 1oo2 
input configuration with Analyzer 100AZI4002B, the output (Valve V101) trips. In this scenario, the 
Risk Index is configured to 0.8 as this is a Safe failure.  
 
 
Emergency shutoff valves (XZVs) as Output Devices of a SIF 
Emergency block valves go by many names: Emergency Shut-Down (ESD) valves, Remote Operated 
Shut-Off Valves (ROSOV), etc. Honeywell generally calls shutoff valves “XV’s” or “HVs”. The ISA 
convention is to put a Z in SIL-rated safety loops, so shutoff valves in SIL-rated service are XZV’s or 
HZV’s.  XZV’s are generally provided with ZSO and ZSC limit switches at the “open” and “closed” end 
of their travel. Thus the time required for such a valve to travel from its active to its “safe” position can 
be measured using the data from the event historian. If a trend chart of the travel-time shows an increase, 
one may anticipate that eventually the travel-time will exceed the required Process Safety Time limit.  
 
   
 
 
Figure 11. Travel time for an HZV to Close 
 
 
Figure 12. Travel time for the same HZV to Open 
 
 
The increasing travel time may be an early warning sign of stickiness. Once it exceeds a threshold, 
Maintenance should take a look.   
 
 
EMPOWERING PHA REVALIDATION TEAMS WITH THEIR PLANT DATA 
 
The cases above show what can be done with historian data to either support the PHA/LOPA 
assumptions or to identify where non-conservative assumptions have been made. It may also reveal 
other opportunities like high spurious trip rates and overly conservative assumptions.  
But anyone who has done this kind of analysis by hand, or using Excel, understands that it’s time-
consuming. In an era of financial constraints, the staff might not get to it. Fortunately, computer tools 
are available which can now search for and report these issues and opportunities, so the site’s process 
safety and functional safety staff can spend their time solving problems rather that downloading data and 
developing pivot-tables – the techniques used for this paper. It’s possible to get a report of demand rates 
and faults, area by area throughout the facility as input to the PHA teams.    
 
How far can this concept be taken? 
 Scrutiny of the historian data enables some diagnostics to show when a degraded condition may have 
occurred.  Honeywell is testing software that allows “degraded” situations to be diagnosed and flagged 
   
 
in real time, so the controls and operations staff can see potential problems and take prompt action to fix 
them.  
 
Analyzer and Transmitter signals, 
or Process Variables (PV’s) 
generally change over time. If the 
signal is not varying in any way 
over a period of time, the analyzer 
or transmitter may have 
developed a fault. Maintenance 
Inspection/ recalibration is 
appropriate - once diagnosed. 
This is a reminder why continuous 
“analog” signals from transmitters 
are more valuable than the on/off 
signals from discrete switches 




Similarly, if a control input is regularly in fault or Bypass mode while being repaired, it seems 
reasonable that the likelihood of an initiating event is higher than if it’s controlling properly.  
Could this kind of data analytics, especially if continuously provided to operations, have diagnosed and 
escalated the issues at Buncefield ahead of time? If the high, high level sensor were a continuous signal 
and if the data were in the historian, and all signals were being continuously analyzed looking from a 
process safety perspective, then it seems possible that it could have.  
 
While this is of particular interest to the site level staff, the division-level staff will want to ensure these 
problems do not persist long-term. Generally site-level needs detail to support the analysis while senior 
levels of the organization need enough detail to know the site–level staff is able to promptly manage any 
issues which are identified.  
 
Closing the loop back to the PHA 
All this data feedback takes effort. The first studies within Honeywell were all done using Excel 
spreadsheets and manual techniques. This was effective, but too time consuming to be sustainable in the 
long term without significant additional staff. The rise of analytical computer tools enables the 
comparisons to be done regularly and much less expensively than using automation engineers to sift 
through the historian data once per month looking for issues.  
 
Still, it’s not without an effort. In order for the analytic engines to find issues, they have to be configured 
with the expected behavior. The Cause and Effect Matrix can be used as a data entry tool once it has 
been created in Excel. But it has to be created, maintained and updated if anything changes. The tools to 
look for flat-lined transmitters have to be configured to know which transmitters are protecting against 
high severity scenarios and thus are important enough to monitor.  
Figure 13 - Diagnosing a "flat-lined" transmitter signal 
   
 
 
How can we convey the expected behavior of our critical control, alarm and interlock protection layers? 
Today we do it manually by reviewing the LOPA and “programming” the analytics tools to look how 
these critical systems are behaving. But a new set of tools is emerging to help set these expectations.  
 
 
The PHA and LOPA recording software can be used to manage this data. One such system is shown in 
the Figure above. This system is “programmed” by the PHA teams during the hazard reviews to 
understand the expected initiating even rate and the desired risk reduction factor for each barrier layer. 
The team needs to be diligent in recording control and interlock loop numbers properly so they can later 
be connected with the historian data, but the reward is significant. As with so many things today, 
bringing all this information into the digital realm enables much more to be done with it. The resulting 
“risk model” provides a real-time view into the actual risk on the site or at the division, regional or even 





The analysis shows that the data in the process and event historians can provide valuable insights into 
the actual safety of our operations as they stand today. Manual analysis showed that the design of the 
Safety Instrumented Functions looked at does provide the target amount of protection. In most cases the 
actual field performance of the SIFs also met target. However, a few did not. As it happened, this didn’t 
matter as the Initiating Event Frequency was actually much better than anticipated by the 
   
 
HAZOP/LOPA team. Nevertheless, analytics from field performance showed opportunities to improve 
the system in a few cases. The issues and opportunities were not apparent at first. Thus the analysis met 
it’s intended purpose.  
 
However, the manual analysis takes resources and time to complete. The addition of more advanced, and 
continuously-running computer analysis tools takes this into the realm of being practical to do all the 
time. And today’s new enterprise-level integrated PHA/LOPA and SIL Calculation systems take this to 
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